The small region now known as East Timor elicited a large international reaction following the outbreak of violence related to the nascent country's independence bid. The United Nations established a transitional government and instituted a truth and reconciliation commission in order to investigate the violence as well as the legacy of several decades of Indonesian occupation. The resulting investigative organ, the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)1 emerged in 2002. This Commission was faced with a myriad of domestic and international obstacles, yet sought to utilize a range of methods and tools to collect information on the suffering of the East Timorese people.
The efficacy of the Commission is a topic of debate for scholars, as differing conceptions of success are touted by various writers. This paper argues that the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation forwent calls to prosecute perpetrators according to a retributive framework. The Commission focused primarily on reconciliation and while substantial efforts were made to undercover the truth, this remained a secondary consideration and overall was incorporated into reconciliation efforts. Specifically this paper will demonstrate that while these conciliatory overtures did little to facilitate justice (in the retributive sense), the use of pragmatic information collection measures, traditional dispute resolution forums and a forgiving restorative process saw important strides made at the communal level to restore individual dignity and reintegrate perpetrators.
Indonesia Seeks to Replace Portugal as Ruler
The need for a truth commission in Timor-Leste arose due to geopolitical complications stemming from the island's status as a Portuguese colonial possession. The area of Timor-Leste was ruled by Lisbon for several centuries as a far-flung trade colony, with Portugal separating the eastern portion of the island and ceding the western portion to the Dutch colonial administration which ruled the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia). East Timor declared independence on November 28th 1975 following the April 25th 1975 coup in Portugal. Soon after its declaration of independence, the East-Timor2 was invaded by Indonesia on December 7th 1976.
Indonesia sought to incorporate Timor-Leste as its 27th province, an effort which was tacitly supported by the U.S. as Washington viewed the Suharto regime was an important regional Cold War ally.3 Indonesia claimed that it held a pre-colonial title to the region and given the illegitimate nature of Portugal's control over East Timor, Jakarta argued that it was justified in its actions. Contrary to the position of the United States and Indonesia, the United Nations did not recognize Indonesia's claim to East Timor, citing the fact that the use of force to reclaim pre-colonial titles on the basis of the illegitimacy of the colonial one was not generally accepted at the international level.4
Despite the lack of international support, Indonesia continued to control Timor-Leste for twenty-four years, engaging in widespread repression against the general populace, as well as engaging in an internecine struggle with a guerrilla resistance movement FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria do Timar Leste Independente).5 Overall mortality estimates for this period range between 102,800 – 200,000 combat and excess deaths.6 Following the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesian president B.J. Habibie announced in a January 1999 agreement to hold a plebiscite in which East Timorese could vote between greater autonomy within Indonesia or independence.7
Almost ninety-nine percent of eligible voters participated in the September 5th 1999 referendum,8 with 78.5 percent of the electorate supporting independence.9 This result led to post-election violence in which the actions of pro-Indonesian militias as well as Indonesian security forces led to between 1400-2000 deaths and forced 250,000-300,000 individuals to flee to West Timor. Moreover, during the violence over seventy percent of East Timor's infrastructure and buildings were destroyed.10 This violence catalysed the international community, with the UN authorizing the Australian led Intervention Force for East Timor (INTERFET), and establishing the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) via Resolution 1272 of October 1999.11
UN Intervention and Administration
Following the establishment of UN transitional control, the Special Rapporteurs of the Human Rights Commission as well as the UN Commission of Enquiry both recommended the creation of an international tribunal similar to those which had been created in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. This recommendation largely fell on deaf ears for several reasons. Firstly, said recommendation elicited significant political and military opposition in Indonesia, with Jakarta refusing to cooperate with any hypothetical tribunal. Even after the end of the CAVR's work, the prospect of justice in East Timor remains a distant one for criticism of Indonesia's intransigence was been muted, as ironically the international community seeks Jakarta's aid in the War on Terror.12
Indonesia's obstructionism, complemented with a general “tribunal fatigue” in the Security Council following the myriad complaints concerning the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals (slow, inefficient, expensive, perceived lack of results) prevented the creation of a East Timor tribunal.13 Consequently, while the need for an investigation was clear, the UN was unwilling to be the primary vehicle for such an enquiry. Hence the UN encouraged the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC), as this would allow East Timor to direct the affair at the national level, as well as the important fact that TRCs tend to be substantially cheaper than international criminal tribunals ($5-30 million for the former as opposed to $100 million plus for the latter).14 These factors led to UNTAET instituting Regulation 2001/10 on July 13th 2001, thereby establishing CAVR.15CAVR which ran from 2002 until December 2005, was an highly interesting project as it incorporated various aspects of international law as well as alternative judicial traditions.
Prior to investigating the methods and procedures of CAVR it is important to first delineate the characteristics of truth commissions in general, in order to better highlight the hybrid nature of CAVR (to be discussed later). Truth commissions adopt a historical record approach, motivated by the belief that knowing and recording the events which took place in order to prevent similar events in the future takes precedence over the desire to facilitate reconciliation via the pardoning of perpetrators.16 TRCs are vested with a general mandate to investigate human rights violations in a way that is more comprehensive than traditional justice and international criminal tribunals.17 This emphasis on documenting events and violations stems from efforts to prevent either intentional or accidental suppression/loss of vital elements of the historical narrative
Retributive, Restorative or Reconciliatory Justice?
By seeking to establish a definitive history, truth commissions desire to prevent the rise of competing narratives which may stoke tensions and precipitate new violence. This prevention of violence is important because, truth commission were initially created in response to such mass violence in countries in which prosecutions were hampered by amnesty law, a lack of political will, entrenched military forces or other barriers.18 Furthermore, these types of commissions act as fora of symbolic satisfaction for victims as well as “for victims (and sometimes perpetrators) to bear witness, investigate the fate of the disappeared, [thereby] creating an environment more ripe for reconciliation and forgiveness than an adversarial trial.”19
The increasing reliance on TRCs is based on the perception that they are mechanisms which serve a myriad of purposes that are usually beyond the purview of national and international law.20 Truth commission were initially conceptualized as means to heal a divided country, yet here CAVR differs from previous truth commissions for it was initiated to mediate between the Indonesian forces and pro-assimilation militias, and the pro-independence segment of the population.21
Moreover while truth commissions are historically implemented when there are entrenched military forces in the country, CAVR focused on human rights violations by occupying power personnel which had already departed. This fact combined with the refusal of the Indonesian government to cooperate with the Commission, saw CAVR enjoy a unique socio-political environment in which it was able to conduct its work utterly unhindered.22 While this allowed CAVR unparalleled latitude, it also diminished the relevance of the Commission as it could not demand that former rulers of East Timor appear before it.23
These unique circumstances, combined with the lack of political will at the UN for a criminal tribunal, and the intransigence of Jakarta, saw East Timorese leaders largely left to their own devices. CAVR was independent of UNTAET government members and cabinet ministers, and was given the power to determine its internal structure, hierarchy and operating procedure.24 As a result CAVR was conceptualized in a manner which opted for reconciliation and restorative justice mechanisms (emphasis on the healing process) over retributive justice. This emphasis on truth and reconciliation over justice can be seen in the name of CAVR itself.
The inclusion of the term “reception” was seen as a reference to the Commission's task of welcoming back pro-Indonesian individuals who had fled East Timor.25 This conciliatory focus was seen in the goals of Regulation 2001/10 which outlined three main tasks for the wider project it was authorizing: investigate facts concerning human rights violations between 1974-1999, help reintegrate less serious perpetrators into communities, and recommend measures to prevent future abuses.26 The emphasis on reconciliation and truth over the concerns of justice is further demonstrated by the mandate of CAVR which included of the following tasks: reporting past violations and identifying factors that led to the events, promoting reconciliation, assisting in restoring the human dignity of victims and supporting the reception and reintegration of individuals who caused their communities harm through minor criminal offences and other acts.27
Note the lack of any duty to ensure that justice is accomplished. This absence is even more explicit in the Commissioner's Oath, the pledge which national and regional CAVR commissioners took upon assuming their duties; “I renounce the unlawful use of violence; and in the performance of my functions will seek to promote reconciliation, national unity and peace.”28
CAVR in Detail
The regulations of CAVR also demonstrated an emphasis on reconciliation over justice by the fact that Section 17.2 of Regulation 2001/10 states that “no witness may be compelled to incriminate the witness' spouse or partner, parents, children or relatives within the second degree.”29 This is very generous provision which while encouraging individuals to come forward and participate does allow for the possibility of violations to go unreported if only family members witnessed the act especially in small communities which are primarily comprised of a few large extended families.
Section 24.2 also demonstrates the prioritization of reconciliation over justice as it states that “where a statement discloses the commission of more than one act the...Committee shall consider the appropriateness [for less serious crime designation] of each act separately.”30 This provision would potentially allow serial offenders and/or offenders whose net violations might constitute a serious crime to benefit from the mercy of the communal reconciliation mechanism which imposes non-criminal 'sentences'.
This focus on national unity, reconciliation and peace is important, because while the East Timorese did believe that perpetrators of serious violations should face punishment; the state of ruin in the country and its precarious relationship with Indonesia heavily promoted conciliatory overtones. Amnesty International recommended that the United Nations Security Council establish an international criminal tribunal for the violations of 1976-1999, yet this suggestion was not acted upon.31
The apathy towards tribunals at the international levels was mirrored by East-Timor president Xanana Gusmao, who objected to the CAVR Chega! Report, criticizing the report for its “grandiose idealism and the insistence on prosecution, retribution, and reparations.”32 Specifically, the Chega! (Portuguese for 'no more', 'enough,' 'stop')33 Report's call for an international war-crimes tribunal elicited criticism from Guasmo who feared that it would re-open societal wounds and threaten the tenuous peace deal with Indonesia.34 Indeed when the report was released in October 2005, it was distributed to the East Timorese parliament, but was not (initially) made public due to Indonesian pressure to the contrary.35
One might view Gusmao's criticism as an unfavourable response to the findings of the Chega! Report. The Commission was explicitly authorized by Section 13.1.(a) of Regulation 2001/10 to investigate actions which were “the result of deliberate planing, policy or authorization on the part of a state, or any of its organs, or of any political organization, militia group, liberation movement, or other group or individual.”36 The Report's findings implicated all sides in the commission of violations,37 yet Gusmao was not unhappy with the methods and findings of the report; he merely felt that reconciliation and forgiveness were paramount.
Citing his experience as a resistance leader and the pain he felt when he lost soldiers, he recalls the words of his deputy who told him to stop crying because “they already dead. Now your duty is not cry for everyone who dies. Take care of us that are still alive.”38 For Gusmao the healing of the present trumps the prosecution of the past. Contrary to Gusmao's perception of the report, David Webster argues that reconciliation and truth are to a degree at odds, for the historical narrative emphasizing national unity in the Chega! Report often, according to Webster “elides the costs of the compromise struck to achieve unity.”39
CAVR as Part of a Hybrid System
The unique situation which existed in East Timor led to the creation of a hybrid system consisting of CAVR alongside the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and other organs. Hybrid tribunals are in theory established by treaty between the UN and the host nation or by UN administrations exercising “sovereignty in trust over in an immediate post-conflict situation,” and have the benefit of being more consensual than the original ad hoc tribunals.40 In this regard East Timor was again unique, because unlike previous TRCs it was the first to be initiated in territory under UN transitional authority.41 In East Timor crimes were divided into serious (crimes against humanity, torture, murder or sexual offences)42 and less serious crimes under the purview of CAVR (theft, minor assault, arson, killing livestock and destruction of crops).43
The problems and short-comings facing CAVR necessitated the adoption of pragmatic and cost-effective means to record and document offences as well as reintegrate offenders. While the serious/less serious dichotomy is clear in theory, there are certain instances in which this distinction becomes problematic. For instance some cases may be better adjudicated by the reconciliation process even though the violation technically falls within the serious category (only a minor role played in a larger group of actions). Secondly, crimes against property (which constitute the majority of potentially via the reconciliation process pardonable offences) could easily turn into war crimes if it is established that they occurred during the course of an armed conflict (pillaging, attacking designated civilian targets).
Both of these potential situations demonstrate the importance of context rather than the abstract nature of the crime.44 Lastly the limited scope of the reconciliation procedure and the violations it covered arguably failed to offer special incentives for the return from West Timor of serious crime perpetrators.45 Despite these hypothetical complications, the distinction between classes of crimes and the accompanying division of responsibility between CAVR and the SCU is important because while UNTAET encouraged the use of local institutions, it did not adopt the Rwandan gacaca model;
abstaining from relying on community based mechanisms for criminal proceedings [utilizing] locally established institutions exclusively as instrument[s] of reconciliation and consensual justice [...] The combination of criminal prosecution, on the one hand and community-based reconciliation procedures, on the other, reflects a sophisticated approach to addressing past human rights tragedies while meeting the practical realities of a transitional process.46
CAVR Faces Significant Shortcomings
By allocating less serious crime adjudication to CAVR, UNTAET was able to relieve the East Timorese judiciary to focus on more pressing cases. By delegating less serious crimes to CAVR, UNTAET allowed the vast majority of violations to be dealt with at the local and regional level in a system which ran parallel yet was still integrated into the criminal justice system.47 This was vital because Timor-Leste's judiciary was virtually non-existent. During its rule, Indonesia had prevented the emergence of any East Timorese judges,48 and any judicial infrastructure, archives and records were destroyed by Jakarta's scorched-earth policy.49
Indeed the dearth of legal expertise was such that UNTAET resorted to using aircraft to drop leaflets over the country seeking people with legal qualifications to join the East-Timor judiciary. While a small pool of accredited lawyers returned from overseas, none of them had experience working as judges or prosecutors.50 This lack of legal expertise saw most local Commission staff operate without any legal training, let alone familiarity with international law.51 Conditions were so bad that CAVR even had difficulty locating copies of basic human rights instruments in accessible languages such as Indonesian.
This lack of international law experience and human rights material was evident by the difficulty faced by some CAVR staff members in accepting that under international law, disappeared persons are not equivalent to dead persons.52 The heated debate which arose whether the forced cutting of captured guerrilla fighter's hair (grown long as a sign of resistance and camaraderie) by Indonesian troops constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment under international law again demonstrates the difficulties facing the largely judicially illiterate CAVR personnel.53
This lack of expertise was also apparent in other aspects of CAVR in which the Commission facilitated three-day healing workshops held for the most affected victims,54 in which 712 victims with urgent needs were identified with each provided a small symbolic reparation of $200.55 While the organization of these workshops were laudable, including drama, music, painting, group prayer and traditional rituals they may have been somewhat ham-fisted given the fact that none of the facilitators were mental health professionals.56
Pragmatic or Haphazard? Review of CAVR's Methodology
Aside from the lack of legal experience among its employees, CAVR had to implement a range of pragmatic and at times unorthodox methods for collecting information. While most TRCs base their empirical findings on databases of testimonies, no such existing database was present in Timor-Leste. Consequently CAVR created the Human Rights Violations Database (HRVD). The HRVD was bolstered by various methods of data collection. One such method was the cataloguing of 319,000 unique graves in public cemeteries, of which roughly half had complete names and dates. While historical demographers have used cemetery records to reconstruct mortality rates, no TRC had ever done so as part of the reconstruction of the historical record.57
While a lot of individuals were identified this way, an obvious drawback is that such a collection method fails to incorporate the many individuals who were not buried in graveyards or in unmarked graves.58 Additionally, CAVR conducted fifty-two public hearings in dedication to the victims,59 as well as 294 half to full-day long forums to document communal violence (attended by an average of sixteen people) in which survivors sketched maps and time-lines for local events. It is important to note these forums were less focused on research as they were organized by the victim support division of CAVR.60
The two largest components of CAVR's activities were the thousands of witness testimonies which collected across the country, and the Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRP). CAVR personnel collected personal depositions and oral records via open-ended interviews in which respondents were allowed to narrate their stories in whichever manner they chose. The only regulation imposed by the Commission was that statement collectors ensure that “there is enough information for the CAVR to understand who did what to whom, when and where and the the causes and consequences of these events.”61
While this simple system allowed CAVR personnel to be easily trained and sent out among the populace, the vague nature of what “enough” information consisted of caused irregularities. Different statement collectors interpreted this condition differently, and as a result interviews ranged from less than an hour to several hours. Another problem was the fact that the Commission rarely assigned personnel to follow up and obtain confirmations and/or clarifications of the information; no formal cross-checking procedure was instituted.62
This lack of follow-up can be in part attributed to the limited resources of the Commission, but also to the way CAVR viewed these statements. CAVR collected 7669 personal accounts63 and asked survivors what assistance they needed during the societal transformation.64 While previous TRCs collected statements mainly for the purposes of justice rather than truth (to build prosecutorial briefs), the stories collected by CAVR had no legal implications. Moreover, the number of accounts recorded represented a convenient sample of individuals who had the opportunity to interact with CAVR personnel.
The Chega! report acknowledged that the information which had been collected from these statements did not represent the total magnitude and overall pattern of violations.65 These accounts had a greater symbolic value as a means for personal narratives to be heard and acknowledged. Given the limitations of CARV resources and the emphasis on reconciliation the social science methodology employed by CAVR “did not yield the kind of comprehensive, indisputable results that the Commission had sought.66 [Moreover it was not] possible to produce from [the] available evidence a quantitatively accurate, generally agreed figure on the death toll in Timor-Leste.”67
Biti Boot: The Success of Community Reconciliation Procedures
While reconciliation efforts did not have much success in the field of justice, CAVR led to real progress in reconciliation at the village level.68 The most successful and popular tool in CAVR's repertoire were the Community Reconciliation Procedures (CRP) which sought to reintegrate offenders of less-serious crimes into their communities by incorporating traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, community input and a focus on forgiveness. Specifically, CRPs were used to “achieve an agreement by perpetrators to undertake community service or other acts of reconciliation after a community-based hearing, which airs the views of all parties and requires an admission and apology from the perpetrator.”69
Regulation 2001/10 Section 27.3 allows CRP deponents to be questioned about involvement of others who were part of the act, and 27.7 defines reconciliation as either reparations, community service, a public apology and/or another act of contrition.70 It is important to note that Section 28.2 notes that “unless the relevant district court considers that the act of reconciliation specified [...] exceeds what is reasonably proportionate to the acts disclosed [...] the District Court shall register the [decision] as an Order of the Court.”71 This is a vital point because it demonstrates the protection of perpetrators from excessive punishment, thereby undermining efforts at revenge or retributive justice, emphasizing reconciliation above all else. Similarly, Section 30.2 outlines the penalties for non-completion of acts of contrition as a prison term not exceeding one year and/or a fine not exceeding $3000.72 These terms again demonstrate the conciliatory nature of the process as even non-compliance is not subject to draconian measures.
Together with their measured nature, CRPs were much cheaper and simpler than a police investigation, merits which are highlighted by the fact that CAVR initiated more than 1500 (surpassing the original goal of 1000) CRPs which drew unexpectedly high levels of community participation with a total attendance of between 30,000-40,000 people.73 CRP popularity was in large part due to the fact that the proceedings allowed communities to take control of their own histories, restore communal dignity and to collectively agree upon punishments. For instance in the village of Matata, twelve men participated in burning houses and intimidating the civilian population.
Using the CRP mechanism, the village collectively decided that for their reconciliation act the perpetrators would help the villages build and raise a new wooden flagpole, raise the new national flag and to then have a big party.74 CRPs were voluntary and heavily based on the East Timorese concept of the biti boot; which refers to the large woven mats used by local chiefs as common ground for community members involved in disputes. Disputes are resolved together on the mat overseen by community leaders; and the incorporation of this tradition into the CRP process led one village elder to state that “today is the end of twenty-four years of suffering, violence and division for our community. In 1999 we saw the Indonesian soldiers and militia leave. On May 20th 2002, we celebrated our independence as a nation. But it is only today that as a community we can be released from our suffering from this terrible past. Let us roll up the mat, and this will symbolize the end of all of these issues for us. From today we will only look forward.”75
Following decades of violence, East Timor finally emerged from Indonesian occupation, an escape precipitated by an outburst of violence in 1999 and the swift intervention of the international community. Under the aegis of the UNTAET, Regulation 2001/10 was passed establishing East Timor's truth and reconciliation commission: CAVR. Faced with massive obstacles – domestically due to the lack of sufficient human capital and infrastructural devastation, and internationally in the form of Indonesian obstinacy – CAVR used a mixture of methods to begin the process of reclaiming the country's history.
While the efficacy of some of these measures can be called into question, the emphasis on reconciliation over retributive justice ameliorated some of these concerns as information was collected to repair society not prosecute rights violators. The collection of stories from individuals and communities allowed CAVR to build a database, which while not exhaustive, allowed for collective healing and the legitimization of past suffering. Through the incorporation of traditional dispute resolution tools, best demonstrated in the use of CRPs, CAVR was able to facilitate marked improvements in communal cohesion, health and memory.
Beigbeder,Yves. International Criminal Tribunals: Justice and Politics. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
Kingston, Jeffrey. “Balancing Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor.” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 3 (2006): 271-302.
McRae, Rowan. “Truth-Seeking for Justice in East Timor.” Alternative Law Journal 31, no.6 (2006): 169-171.
Roosa, John. “How Does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth Is? The Case of East-Timor's CAVR.” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007/2008): 569-580.
----------- “East Timor's Truth Commission: Introduction to Pacific Affairs Special Forum,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007/2008): 563-567.
Roper, Steven D. & Lilian A. Barria. Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006.
Stahn, Carsten. “Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Recognition: The United Nations Truth Commission for East Timor.” American Society of International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 952-966.
Silove, D, A.B. Zwi & D. le Touze. “Do Truth Commissions Heal? The East Timor Experience.” The Lancet 367, no. 9518 (April 2006): 1222-1224.
Van der Wolf, W. & C. Tofan eds. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in East Timor. Nijmegen: International Courts Association, 2011.
Van Schaack, Beth & Ronald C. Slye eds. International Criminal Law and its Enforcement: Cases and Materials. 2nd ed. New York: Foundation Press, 2010.
1CAVR refers to the Portuguese acronym for the Commission, it is the most commonly used term in the literature and will be used by this paper instead of the anglicized acronym CTRC
2This paper uses “Timor-Leste” and “East Timor” interchangeably, in part due to the variation inherent in the literature, as well as stylistic considerations
3Yves Beigbeder, International Criminal Tribunals: Justice and Politics (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 110.
4Beth van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye eds., International Criminal Law and its Enforcement: Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2010), 185.
5Carsten Stahn, “Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Recognition: The United Nations Truth Commission for East Timor,” American Society of International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 953.
6Jeffrey Kingston, “Balancing Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 3 (2006): 279.
8W. van der Wolf & C. Tofan eds., The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in East Timor, (Nijmegen: International Courts Association, 2011), xvii.
10Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 50.
14Schaack & Slye, 185.
16Schaack & Slye, 5.
18Schack & Slye, 11.
19Schaack &Slye, 11.
21John Roosa, “East Timor's Truth Commission: Introduction to Pacific Affairs Special Forum,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007/2008): 564.
24Wolf & Tofan, 113.
27Wolf & Tofan, xiii.
34D. Silove, A.B. Zwi & D. le Touze, “Do Truth Commissions Heal? The East Timor Experience,” The Lancet 367, no. 9518 (April 2006): 1222.
37Wolf & Tofan, 486.
39John Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth Is? The Case of East-Timor's CAVR,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007/2008): 566.
40Schaack & Slye, 191.
42Schaack & Slye, 186.
48Rowan McRae, “Truth-Seeking for Justice in East Timor,” Alternative Law Journal 31, no.6 (2006): 170.
54Wolf & Tofan, xvi.
55Wolf & Tofan, 487.
56D. Silove, A.B. Zwi & D. le Touze, 1222.
57Wolf & Tofan, 356.
58Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission Find Out what the Truth Is? The Case of East-Timor's CAVR,” 576.
59Wolf & Tofan, xvi.
60Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission....,” 578.
61Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission... ,” 578.
64Wolf & Tofan, 486.
65Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission... ,” 572-573. - “[The CAVR Commission was] created in a strikingly different environment to a number of other truth and reconciliation commissions whose mandates recognized the importance of preparing as fully as possible, individual cases in order to facilitate prosecutions.”
66Roosa, “How Does a Truth Commission... ,” 566.
67Wolf & Tofan, 358.
68Wolf & Tofan, xv.
75Wolf & Tofan, xv.