Himalayan Hurdles: The 1962 War and a Legacy of Indo-Chinese Territorial Disputes
The emergence of the Indian Republic in 1947 and the People's Republic of China in 1949 drastically altered the political landscape of Asia. These two ancient civilizations, now encapsulated in nascent states in the mid 20th century soon found themselves hamstrung by history. The legacy of British colonial rule, the fall of the Qing dynasty and the emergence of a de facto independent Tibet eventually led to an ever-intensifying border dispute.
Conflicting views and claims dating from the colonial past eventually erupted into war in 1962, leading to defeat for India and establishing a long-running distrust between New Delhi and Beijing. This paper argues that India, particularly its top leadership was not cognisant of the severity of the border issue, a deficit which led to war India's humiliation in 1962. Moreover this paper shall demonstrate how the actions of 1962 have led to the border dispute becoming a key aspect in Indo-Chinese relations, one which acts as a geopolitical barometer, reflecting levels of hostility, and highlighting national priorities.
To a large extent the current tensions which exists between Indian and China are the result of India's legacy as the (primary) successor state to the British Raj. During the colonial period Britain focused on maintaining the Empire's most lucrative and populous colony, and as such sought to ensure secure borders as well as the establishment of zones of influence which would provide British India with a buffer zone from any potential aggressors. In 1890 Britain and the Qing dynasty signed the Anglo-Chinese Convention which demarcated the borders of Sikkim, part of Britain's sphere of influence, and Tibet.1
A similar agreement occurred during the Simla Conference proceedings of 1913-1914 in which Britain negotiated directly with the semi-autonomous regime in Tibet, although Chinese representatives were also present. The fall of the Qing regime in 1912 left the status on Tibet in question, and as such Britain sought commercial and political inroads into the region in order to project imperial power, but also to establish a buffer zone for British India. The Chinese delegation refused to accept the terms of the Convention and left the proceedings, after which Britain voided their initial participation and signed the accord with the Tibetans the same day.
The Simla Conference concluded with Britain and Tibet delineating their borders along the McMahon Line, with 5180 square kilometres2 of Tibetan territory falling under British control. Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary of British India oversaw the implementation of the eponymous line as the definitive border between Tibet and India in the eastern sector of the Himalayas, resulting in the creation of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).3
Following the withdrawal of Britain from the Indian subcontinent and the establishment of an independent India in 1947, the new republic sought to style itself as the successor to British India. Consequently Indian leaders sought to maintain the treaties which had been signed by Britain on behalf of the Raj, for in New Delhi's opinion the Simla Accord transferred not only the territorial sovereignty over NEFA but also Britain’s various privileges in Tibet.4 Ideally India sought the incorporation of Tibetan territories near it into the Republic,5 yet such aspirations were abandoned after 1949 in favour of establishing friendly relations with the nascent People's Republic of China (PRC).6
The emergence of the PRC saw Beijing seek to reassert itself following a century of decline, and this strong impulse for rectification of past humiliations led the PRC to seek Tibet's reincorporation into the central government. Seeking to reverse Tibet's de facto independence which had prevailed during the preceding decades, China began to reassert itself in the region in 1949 and 1950. This situation caused alarm in India during 1950 with the Hitavada paper warning in January 12th 1950 that if Tibet falls then it remains only a matter of time before Kashmir, Nepal and Bengal become prey to Communism.7 In contrast to such concerns, Nehru sought to befriend rather than ostracize the PRC, seeking to incorporate the Chinese into world affairs and reduce tensions by ending their international isolation.8 Nehru sought to refrain from instigating an international incident over Tibet,9 a position clarified by his note from November 18th 1950 in which he stated that;
[China] is going to be our close neighbour for a long time to come. We are going to have a tremendously long common frontier...China will take possession of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so.10
This position makes sense when one examines Nehru's position regarding the status of India's northern borders, as extrapolated in an address to Parliament two days later. Nehru argued that “the frontier from Bhutan eastward has been clearly defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Simla Convention of 1914...our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary – map or no map.”11 India undertook a similar stance in on the north-western border in 1953. New Delhi resurrected the Ardagh-Johnson line which included the strategic area of Aksai Chin and was thought to conform to the perceived borders of the pre-colonial Dogra kingdom in Kashmir.
Unfortunately for India, China viewed Aksai Chin as vitally important as it was key to controlling not just western but the entirety of Tibet.12 Nehru was not overly concerned with Chinese actions in Tibet because he did not foresee any problems arising from competing territorial claims. Nehru accepted the fact that China would take all of Tibet, because unlike the Chinese he did not view any Indian territory as comprising a part of Tibet. Moreover given the bitter personal disappointment that was the Partition and the loss of significant portions of the subcontinent, Nehru's steadfast position on India's borders is not surprising.
The Tibet Factor
China's “liberation” of Tibet in 1951 saw the PRC take over total control over the region with Radio Beijing stating on November 3rd 1951 that Tibet had agreed to China stationing troops on the frontiers of India, Pakistan and Burma.13 China viewed Tibet as a fundamental part of its territory and its “liberation” was a response to Tibet's splitting off from the central government by the actions and influence peddling of Western powers. In accordance with China's effort to rectify past wrongs, the Chinese government declared that it did not recognize the terms of unjust treaties which were imposed on the imperial regime.
This claim also encapsulated the various agreements and treaties in the India-Tibet region. Given Beijing's anti-imperialism combined with the fact that Chinese delegates had walked out of the Simla Convention, the PRC refused to acknowledge the tenets of said accord. Beijing also called into question the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention on the Sikkim border as well as the validity of the 1842 border treaty between Kashmir and Tibet.14 This turn of events greatly exasperated the border issue, as now China was calling into question Indian territorial claims along the entire shared border.
Chinese denial of previous treaty terms was in part influenced by the perception that India was not overly interested in the region. For instance until early 1951 Nehru was still denying the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet,15 ignoring Vallabhbhai Patel's warnings about Chinese ambitions on India's northern and north-eastern frontiers. Nehru concurred with K.P.S. Menon and K.M. Panikkar that the friendship between the two countries would diffuse any tensions.16 This perception of a lack of tensions led to a lack of urgency, as seen in the case of Tawang in the NEFA.
Slow to act, India only formally annexed the strategically important town and monastery of Tawang in NEFA in February 1951, despite “controlling” it since the Simla Accord.17 This lethargy is doubly surprising given the fact that Tawang is situated on a vital corridor from Tibet into NEFA. Moreover Tawang was the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama, and therefore China considered an integral part of Tibet.18 Consequently should the “reincarnation of the Dalai Lama be discovered in Bhutan, or somewhere in India, especially Sikkim, Tawang or Arunachal Pradesh, India [would] come under intense pressure from China.”19 More strikingly, when in 1953 Indian troops found a Chinese encampment at Barahoti in Uttar Pradesh, the Foreign Office only issued a bland statement that glossed over the issue.20
Initially, this relaxed stance appeared to be the correct course for 1954 saw the signing of the Panchsheel Treaty (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) which recognized Chinese rule over Tibet, although what constituted Tibet differed for both governments. These differing conceptualizations of Tibet were not openly aired and as the treaty stipulated mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other, Nehru et al. continued to downplay the severity of the border issue.21 Importantly Nehru was unable to secure a Chinese endorsement of India's border claims over Himalayan territory inherited from the British.22
This is odd given the fact that Nehru was beginning to become suspicious of China. His suspicions were aroused by the fact that China rejected India's offer to honour the treaty for twenty-five years, instead insisting on the treaty expiring after eight years. Nehru noted this and informed the defence, home, and external affairs ministries that the northern frontier “should be considered a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody.”23 If Nehru suspected any nefarious Chinese plans he did not act upon such suspicions, as India's defence spending declined during the 1954-1962.24
Nehru Taken By Surprise
An unwillingness to acknowledge or counter Chinese designs for the Sino-Indian frontier region appears to have gripped the senior Indian leadership, a lack of action which emboldened the Chinese to solidify their position. In 1956 China took control of the Tunjun La and Shipki La passes,25 and in 1957, assuming it was in its own territory and meeting no Indian resistance, China occupied a 59,000 square kilometre section of the eastern bulge of the Ladakh section of Kashmir (Aksai Chin).26
The border issue continued to remain a minor concern for India until 1958. During this year India experienced two shocks. The first centred around the remarks of Zhou Enlai to Nehru stating that no border treaty had ever been signed and that disputes existed.27 This led Nehru begin to “constantly...inform the Indian Parliament about the state of Sino-Indian relations, [especially since] Zhou openly claimed that the entire...border was unmarked and also laid claim to [over 100,000 square kilometres] of territory under Indian control.” The second revelation was the discovery in 1958 that China had built a road from Xinjiang to Tibet across the Aksai Chin region.28 The road was built during 1956-1957 and was 12,000 kilometres long. Nehru had initially dismissed claims of the road's existence as fantastical,29 yet once;
Indian border troops discovered [the] Chinese road on top of the disputed Aksai Chin plateau, the parliament cried foul and demanded that the road be bombed out of existence. Nehru was obliged to veer and respond to these calls with nationalist rhetoric. Whereas hitherto the boarder had not been a matter of national interest, the Himalayas now became the crown of India, and part of her culture, blood, and veins.30
After claiming that “not a blade of grass” grew on land in Ladkh claimed by India but used by China's road,31 and amid heightened tensions following the 1959 Tibetan revolt, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India and the resulting Chinese troops presence at the border,32 Nehru appeared to recognize the emotive overtones (albeit understating the scale) of the dispute, stating in an address to the Lok Sabha in September 1959 that in;
petty disputes it seems to me absurd for two great countries to rush at each other's throat and decide whether two miles of territory are on this side or on that side. But where national prestige is involved, it is not the two miles of territory that matter, but the nation's dignity and self-respect.33
The same month as Nehru's above statement, China published official maps which incorporated NEFA into China.34 These maps were released two weeks after Indian troops were forced to abandon their positions in Longju, and a mere month from the Kongka Pass Incident. On October 21st 1959 Chinese and Indian troops exchanged fire resulting in the deaths of one Chinese soldier, seven Indians and the capture of a further seven Indian soldiers.35
The deaths which resulted from the Kongka Pass clash saw a dramatic shift in Nehru's rhetoric in Parliament. It is most interesting to compare his statements above from September with the following from November 1959, in which he wishes that
the Chinese government and indeed other nations would try to understand [that] the Himalayas are something much more to us and more intimately tied up with India's history, tradition, faith, religion, beliefs, literature, and culture...they are part of ourselves...[the border] question affects our innermost being.36 [More pragmatically K.M. Panikkar stated that] the essential point about the Himalayas is not their width of 150 miles, but the [Tibetan] plateau behind it [...] in fact the vast barrier upland behind the Himalayas provides the most significant defence in depth imaginable [...] the creation of a broader no man's land on both sides of the Himalayas will give the Indian peninsula sufficient area for the development of her defence potential.37
In the spirit of K.M. Panikkar's statement, Nehru renegotiated treaties with Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim to bring them within India's northern security perimeter.38 Moreover he promised to Parliament that India would take “effective action” to recover its territory, initiating India's “forward policy” which sought to reassert control over disputed regions by sending Indian troops to occupy contested areas, forcing the Chinese to leave.
India Ossifies Stance, Rejects Conciliation
During the early 1960s, India persisted with this policy, refusing any conciliatory overtures from China. In early 1960 Zhou Enlai travelled to India with a flexible proposal which would see China recognize the line of control in both the eastern and western sectors, in return for India's recognition of China's position in Aksai Chin.39 This proposal would not see China contest the McMahon line in the east, thereby allowing New Delhi to retain the southern Himalayan slopes key to the defence of north-eastern India.40 New Delhi promptly refused.
Nehru's refusal to engage China diplomatically can be criticized as a lack of vision by India, a critique compounded by the fact that prior to arriving in New Delhi, Zhou Enlai had signed a border demarcation treaty with Burma in Rangoon,41 and following his stay in India he proceeded to Nepal where he also signed a border delineation agreement with Katmandu.42 Tensions continued to worsen with India entrenching its “no negotiations” stance, recalling its ambassador from Beijing in 196143 and by September 1962 reclaiming some 6500 square kilometres of the 36,000 under dispute in Ladakh and completely easing Chinese forces out of Beijing's claims in NEFA.44 In response by September 1962 there were eight Chinese divisions on the Sino-Indian border.45
Tensions finally reached an insurmountable level, when on October 20th 1962, some 30,000 Chinese troops crossed the border in various locations along the shared frontier.46 The Chinese response to increasing Indian advances in the disputed territory can be summed up by Mao's statement that “Are we going to invade others? No, we will invade no one anywhere. But if others invade us, we will fight back.”47 Ironically both sides considered the other the aggressor and, for China viewed India as encroaching on territory it considered its own, with its retaliation a defensive action, and India saw the Chinese invasion as an offensive act.
Unlike India, the Chinese military did not underestimate the Indian army, and combined with surprise (especially since Nehru had acknowledged the potential for war with China but had considered India sufficiently prepared to repel an attack) and greater numbers, quickly secured large advances into India proper.48 In comparison the state of Indian forces in the disputed areas was woefully inadequate, with troops sporting outdated weapons, a lack of proper clothing, supplies, and logistical support.49
On October 24th China suggested a ceasefire, disengagement and negotiations and similarly on November 8th China suggested that both parties retreat twenty kilometres behind their respective sides of the McMahon Line. India refused both offers stating that it would only treat with China after it had removed all troops from Indian soil.50 Consequently fighting continued until November 20th when Beijing declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew to its former positions,51 imposing conditions it had sought all along.52
Indian morale was destroyed and the country and leadership saw their defeat as a national humiliation. As a result of the war, China remained in sole possession of the Aksai Chin region. Furthermore, during the war China had initiated talks with Pakistan regarding their common border. These talks, which concluded on March 2nd 1963, saw Pakistan transfer approximately 7000 square kilometres of Kashmir to China. This action greatly angered India, as Pakistan had effectively gifted land to China that was under dispute between Islamabad and New Delhi.53
Wartime Legacy Propagates Decades of Tensions
As a consequence of these actions, Indian foreign policy was greatly affected vis-à-vis China and the border regions, remaining tense until the present day. In reaction to the misinformed and distracted behaviour prior to the war, India overreacted, hardening its no-negotiation stance, contending that its was the lack of a strong presence in the border areas and firm hand when dealing with China that doomed the country in the 1962 war. This shift in policy can be seen by the fact that Nehru doubled the Indian defence budget in 1963.54
It did not take long for the border issue to reemerge, thereby continuing the tension and mistrust between India and China. During the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China demanded the demolition of fifty-seven Indian military posts which it claimed were illegally on Tibetan territory. India was given seventy-two hours to comply, yet Indian refusal combined with international support for India led the ultimatum to die a quiet death.55 Tensions flared up again in 1967 as both sides exchanged artillery fire in the NEFA.56 The 1970s began in a promising manner, for in 1970 Mao sought to repair relations with India, again proposing the plan Zhou had presented in 1960.
This offer was important because it marked the last time that China would offer such a flexible and pragmatic solution to the border dispute. Whether India was willing to negotiate is not known, for if any efforts at rapprochement existed they were quickly eclipsed by the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.57 With the exception of the 1975 border clash between India and China, the 1970s were a relatively quiet period. The aforementioned 1975 clash coincided with India's absorption of Sikkim into the Republic following a plebiscite in the region. China protested this move as it considered Sikkim as part of the area under dispute.58
During the 1980s and 1990s relations between New Delhi and Beijing remained tense, yet there developed a common wisdom that “since neither China nor India would ever give up the areas they occupied, the most feasible settlement would be acceptance by both sides of the existing line of actual control (LAC), with some minor adjustments.”59 In conjunction with such thinking, during December 1981 and September 1984 India and China engaged in five rounds of discussions, with China in 1982 suggesting that both countries recognize the status quo (China in Aksai Chin and India in NEFA). Again India refused to entertain this option.60
During the mid-1980s talks had slowed to a stalemate as several incidents raised tensions to new heights. In 1984 India seized positions on the Siachen glacier from Pakistan in a move that worried Beijing. 1986 saw a border clash between China and India erupt in the Sumdorong Chu valley following Indian claims that China had built a helipad on its territory. Over the next year tensions rose with widespread fear that a second war was a distinct possibility. Tensions were not helped by India's Operation Chequerboard which in 1986-87 simulated a border war along the McMahon line, with India amassing 400,000 troops in NEFA to conduct training.61
Moreover during this same time period India undertook the reorganization of the NEFA into the state of Arunachal Pradesh, incorporating it into the Indian Union.62 Despite these increased tensions, in November 1987 a new round of talks were initiated in which “the old Indian stand that no negotiations were necessary because the boundary was well known, or that there could be no talks without prior vacation of Chinese troops from Ladakh, was buried quietly.”63
Tensions Thaw, Talks Commence
The late 1980s and 1990s saw a thawing of Indo-Chinese relations as demonstrated by the fourteen rounds of negotiations held between 1988 and 2002. This thaw was also notably signalled by Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to China, the first such visit in twenty-five years, which resulted in the creation of a joint working group to resolve the border issue.64 This visit was reciprocated by Li Peng's visits to India in 1991 and 1993, with the signing on September 7th 1993 of “peace and tranquillity” agreement between Li Peng and Narasimha Rao respecting the LAC.65
A similar agreement was signed in 1996 during Jiang Zemin's India trip which saw both sides renounce the use of military force, limit deployment and work together on issues of mutual security. 66 Whereas these meetings helped break down the lack of communication between India and China, it is important to note that during the 1999 Kargil War, China increased the intensity and frequency of its intrusions in the Ladakh region.67 Therefore “despite the landmark agreements of 1993 and 1996, and a number of visits by leaders of the highest level, the two countries took five years to exchange maps. Consequently there persist, a sort of stagnation in efforts toward LAC delineation and balanced troop reduction.”68
This lethargy at the negotiation table has prolonged efforts to reach a settlement, and this severely undermined efforts at resolution as India's patience to negotiate is dwindling and since 2005 China has taken on an increasingly hardline stance on the border issue in part due to its rising international political and military clout. Zhou Enlai's offer is now firmly off the table,69 with China stating that “unless India is ready to make territorial concessions, the border issue cannot be resolved for the next thousand years.”70 China alleges that India controls 90,000 square kilometres of territory it deems to be Chinese, citing the ominous statistic that this area corresponds to two-and-a-half Taiwans.71 Moreover Chinese military commanders in Chengdu and Lanzhou acknowledge that a potential war with India remains central their military scenarios and planning.72
Talks Stall, Geo-politics Take Over
In addition to this contingency planing by China, in 2007 India increased the manpower of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police by twenty battalions, battalions which will join the Indian 2nd Mountain Division whose motto perhaps unsurprisingly given the historical tensions, remains “They Shall Not Pass.”73 Therefore despite another fourteen rounds of negotiations between 2003 and 2011, little has been accomplished as relations and tensions have again worsened. Since 2005 China has referred to Arunachal Pradesh as Zangnan, or southern Tibet in Chinese.74 This term has only been in existence since 2005, does not represent a historical name for the region and is merely a tool to bolster Chinese claims to the area.75
2006 saw Beijing further increase its demands for populated areas, notably Tawang, despite a 2005 guideline76 between China and India and signed by Wen Jiabao stating that there would be no transfer of populated areas in a border settlement.77 India characterized the terms of such demands by China as “humiliating and non-negotiable,”78 yet in May 2007 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi informed his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee that the “mere presence of populated area in Arunachal Pradesh would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary.”79 The same month an Indian official from Arunachal Pradesh was denied a visa to China and in 2007 there were 170 border incursions by Chinese troops.
In 2008 there were 210 incursions and 2300 instance of aggressive border patrolling, with a similar number in 2009.80 These incursions coincide with Chinese criticism of PM Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh in January 2008 to unveil major infrastructure projects. Moreover during the 2008 Tibetan riots, China increased border incursions in large part to dissuade India of any notions of weakness or lack of control.81 PM Singh was similarly rebuked by China for a campaign visit for the Arunachal Pradesh legislative elections in October 2009. Amusingly a month later India approved a visit by the Dalai Lama to Tawang, followed by China blocking a $2.9 billion dollar Indian loan request from the Asian Development Bank because $60 million was earmarked for watershed development in Arunachal Pradesh.82
Whereas the issue of the border demarcation of India's northern frontier initially emerged as a concern of the British colonial authority, following independence in 1947 India slowly became aware of the importance of the Himalayan region to its national defence interests. Moreover India came into conflict with Asia's other great and ancient civilization; China. The escalation of the border issue from minor peripheral annoyance to the grounds for war caught India off guard and precipitated a short but humiliating war in which India found itself humbled.
Following the 1962 war, India sought to compensate for its past failings by hardening its stance and refusing compromise. Eventually, following several tense decades interspersed with violent clashes, New Delhi yielded to the idea of negotiation. Unfortunately progress was slow, eventually stagnating, taxing Indian patience to negotiate as well as eroding China's inclination toward conciliation and mediation. By the new millenia India faced an ever more assertive China, with both sides using the border issue to vent mutual frustrations and engage in sabre rattling on the roof of the world.
Chacko, Priya. Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004. Interventions. London: Routledge, 2012.
Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. Warfare and History. London: Routledge, 2001.
Ganguly, Sumit. “India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security.” in The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. eds. Frankel, Francine R. & Harry Harding. 103-133. New York: Colombia University Press, 2004.
Holslag, Jonathan. China and India: Prospects for Peace. Contemporary Asia in the World. New York: Colombia University Press, 2010.
Malik, Mohan. China and India: Great Power Rivals. Boulder: First Forum Press, 2011.
Mansingh, Surjit. “Perceptions and India-China Relations at the End of the Colonial Era.” in Indian and China in the Colonial World. ed. Thampi, Madhavi. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005.
Pardesi, Manjeet S. “Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Do Domestic Politics Matter?” in Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two Level Games. eds. Ganguly Sumit & William R. Thompson. 79-117. Stanford Security Series. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011
Saksena, Shalini. “Indian Perceptions of the Emergence of the People's Republic of China.” in Indian and China in the Colonial World. ed. Thampi, Madhavi. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005.
Ray, Jayanta Kumar. India's Foreign Relations 1947-2007. South Asian History and Culture. London: Routledge, 2011.
Van Praagh, David. The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003.
Worthing, Peter. A Military History of Modern China: From the Manchu Conquest to Tian'anmen Square. Westport Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007.
1Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Warfare and History, (London: Routledge, 2001), 260.
2For the sake of consistency, all land claims are given in square kilometres. As a result some quotations have been altered
3Jayanta Kumar Ray, India's Foreign Relations 1947-2007, South Asian History and Culture, (London: Routledge, 2011), 197.
4Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Do Domestic Politics Matter?” in Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two Level Games, eds. Ganguly Sumit & William R. Thompson, Stanford Security Series. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 95.
7Shalini Saksena, “Indian Perceptions of the Emergence of the People's Republic of China,” in Indian and China in the Colonial World, ed. Thampi, Madhavi, (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005), 219.
9Saksena, 221. “Nehru views the establishment of the Peking regime as the culminating act of a century-old political renaissance...to be welcomed as part of the decline of Western colonial influence all over Asia. A sense of Asian solidarity takes precedence over divergent ideologies and social, economic and political systems.”
10Surjit Mansingh, “Perceptions and India-China Relations at the End of the Colonial Era,” in Indian and China in the Colonial World, ed. Thampi, Madhavi, (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005), 238.
19Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals. (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2011), 143.
20Sumit Ganguly, “India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and International Security,” in The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know, eds. Frankel, Francine R. & Harry Harding, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2004), 112.
21Peter Worthing, A Military History of Modern China: From the Manchu Conquest to Tian'anmen Square, (Westport Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007), 164.
26David Van Praagh, The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 270.
30Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace, Contemporary Asia in the World, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2010), 39.
31Van Praagh, 270.
33Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004, Interventions, (London: Routledge, 2012), 94.
39Van Praagh, 273.
42Van Praagh, 273.
44Van Praagh, 272.
49Pradesi, 106. Ray, 260.
52Van Praagh, 285.
53Pradesi, 107-108. Ray, 302.
65Ganguly, 123. Ray, 310. – Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas
66Ray, 312. – Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas
76Malik 147, - Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles – Article VII
80Malik, 43, 147.